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To discuss the challenges of controlling the intelligence system in a democracy, and to 
highlight the dangers to democratic consolidation arising from the past intrusion of 
intelligence agencies into broad areas of the state and society. 
 
II. Lecture Outline 
 
A. The Role Of Intelligence Organizations Within Democracies  
 
Intelligence organizations perform essential functions in a democracy – informing the 
government of what it needs to know about external and internal threats. 
 
1. What is intelligence? 
a) As process: it is the means by which governments request, 
collect, analyze, and disseminate certain types of required 
information. 
b) As product: it is the product of these processes, i.e., the 
analyses. 
c) As organization: it is the agencies that carry out its functions.  
2. Functions of intelligence: 
a) Collection – including all clandestine and open sources. 
b) Analysis – including marketing the product to leaders. 
c) Counterintelligence – the main function of intelligence in many 
countries. 
d) Covert Operations – ranges from propaganda to paramilitary 
activities. 
3. The Intelligence Cycle: 
a) Planning and Direction 
b) Collection 
c) Processing 
d) Analysis and Production 
e) Dissemination 
 
B. Sources Of Poor Intelligence/State Relations 
 
Clash of two cultures, one democratic, and the other secretive.  All governments, 
especially democratic ones, live in a paradoxical relationship with their 
intelligence agencies: they are deeply suspicious of them, but often appear 
powerless to reform them. As a consequence, governments often prefer to keep 
intelligence agencies marginalized, under funded, and “mediocre.” However, this 
approach inhibits the development of mature intelligence/state relations, and 
virtually guarantees a dysfunctional relationship between a government and its 
intelligence agencies that may threaten political stability. Several questions should 
be posed to regarding the relationship between the state and intelligence agencies: 
 
1. Is there a clear legal framework to guide the activities of intelligence 
agencies? 
2. Are the main producers and consumers of intelligence military or 
civilian? 
3. What is the bureaucratic organization: to who are the intelligence 
agencies accountable? 
a) Is there a concept of an intelligence community:  military 
intelligence agencies, law enforcement, and ministry of foreign 
affairs, security intelligence?  How do they interface? 
b) Is counterintelligence separate from the collectors? 
c) Are covert operations and analysis done by the same agency? 
d) Is there executive oversight? 
e) Is there legislative oversight? 
4. Who has access to the information produced? When? 
 
C. Problems in Reforming Intelligence Agencies. 
 
Intelligence agencies are difficult to control because of their secretive nature and 
their bureaucratic organization. 
 
1. The personal and organizational characteristics of intelligence 
agencies can result in impunity and negate accountability. 
2. The behavioral and attitudinal characteristics of intelligence officers 
may lead them to subvert restraints. 
3. Fear of jeopardizing national survival can impede reform efforts. 
Governments must minimize the sources of mistrust with intelligence 
agencies. Specifically, they must work to make intelligence agencies 
efficient, to integrate them into the decision-making process so that they 
can perform their primary function – inform policy. However, for this 
process to be successful, intelligence agencies must be contained within 
strict limits of their mission.  This requires that they be held accountable to 
democratic institutions.   
4. There is little incentive for politicians to demand strict democratic 
control of intelligence services – no constituency. 
 
D. What Can Be Done About This?  
 
Ensure that a clear distinction between politics and intelligence is maintained. 
Prevent the blurring of boundaries between intelligence, policy and personal 
ambition in the political culture.  
1. Define the mission: to inform policy, preferably on national security 
issues. 
1. Recruitment: civilian-run agencies free of partisan control. 
2. Bureaucratic structure: intelligence agencies must be accountable, and 
clear lines of authority must be established.  
a) Democratic control – legislative oversight and control of the 
budget. 
b) Executive direction – create an executive agency clearing 
house where intelligence from all sources is integrated into policy 
recommendations made available to chief executive (US National 
Security Council as example). 
c) Multiple advocacies – competitive intelligence organizations 
that offer multiple channels of information. 
3. In emerging democracies, particularly those where security 
intelligence agencies predominated, particular tasks need to be undertaken 
to assert control over intelligence agencies: 
a) Interest civilians in, and properly prepare them for, work and 
control of the intelligence organization. 
b) Generate a public debate on the role of intelligence in 
democracies so that the population can assess the proper role of 
intelligence agencies in their country. 
c) Create a formal selection and education process that 
emphasizes expertise, corporateness, and professionalism to 
prepare intelligence officers for their responsibilities to the state. 
 
III.  Conclusion:  
 
What intelligence agencies crave is influence. They want to be listened to. The best way 
to insure healthy state/intelligence relations is to integrate intelligence agencies into the 
decision-making process so that they can perform their primary function – inform policy. 
Intelligence agencies must remain accountable and confined to their professional role - to 
create an intelligence culture compatible with democratic values.  Intelligence activities 
must be continually reviewed to ensure they are legally sound, morally defensible, and 
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